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Chapter Highlights
•

Awareness is a necessary first step toward reducing implicit bias.

•

One way to raise awareness about racial bias in a criminal case is to
make race salient.

•

Making race salient means calling attention to the possibility that
racial stereotypes or racial prejudice may have influenced the actions
of the parties in the case.

•

Becoming aware of the existence of implicit bias and the fact that
everyone is influenced by implicit bias alone is not sufficient to
break the prejudice habit.

•

One must also be motivated to break the prejudice habit and be
trained in ways to overcome bias.
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Introduction
For more than half a century, research on bias has focused on the idea that
interpersonal contact with diverse others is the best way to reduce prejudice.
Perhaps the most well-known proponent of the intergroup contact thesis was
Gordon Allport, who argued in his book, The Nature of Prejudice, that intergroup interactions involving individuals of equal status from different groups
would lead to a reduction in prejudice.1 Since Allport’s book was first published in 1954, much of the empirical research on bias reduction has focused
on Allport’s intergroup contact hypothesis.2 This research has confirmed that
intergroup contact reduces self-reported measures of prejudice.3
Allport’s work relied on conscious action and self-reporting. Self-reporting,
however, tells only half the story. One can honestly believe it is wrong to discriminate against others and thus have low self-reported measures of prejudice, yet still have biased thoughts and engage in discriminatory behavior. A
wealth of research over the past decade has shown that even when individuals do not consciously embrace prejudicial attitudes, they still manifest implicit
bias, reflected in the tendency to associate members of different social groups—
African-Americans, Latinos, Asian-Americans, gays, elderly people, and
women—with stereotypes of these groups. This kind of stereotyping often takes
place without conscious thought or awareness.
The existence of implicit bias has been demonstrated by several different measures, including the Implicit Association Test (IAT), which compares
response times when individuals are tasked with linking different sets of
images and words.4 The IAT measures implicit bias by comparing the amount
of time it takes to hit a specified computer key when one is shown images and
words that one expects to go together, such as images of flowers and positive
words like “pretty,” to response times when one observes images and words
that one does not expect to go together, such as pictures of cockroaches and
words like “lovely.”5 Time after time, individuals respond more quickly when
they see images and words that are typically associated with one another and
more slowly when they see images and words that are not commonly linked.6
For example, most people are quicker to link Black faces with negative words
and White faces with positive words, suggesting implicit racial bias in favor of
Whites and against Blacks.7 Most people, including the elderly themselves, are
quicker to associate good words with young people and bad words with elderly
people, suggesting implicit ageism.8 Over 14 million IATs measuring bias
based on age, gender, ethnicity, and other kinds of biases have been recorded.9
Seventy-five percent of the individuals who have taken the race IAT have demonstrated implicit bias in favor of Whites over Blacks.10
Once social scientists began to recognize that bias can operate without conscious awareness, they began trying to find ways to reduce not simply outward
expressions of prejudice but also implicit bias. Reducing implicit bias, however, has proven to be a more difficult task than reducing explicit expressions
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of prejudice. This is because all of us engage in what Patricia Devine calls the
prejudice habit.11 Devine posits that in order to break the prejudice habit, there
must be (1) awareness, (2) desire or motivation to break the prejudice habit,12
and (3) training in ways that one can overcome bias.13

I.

Raising Awareness

This chapter focuses on just the first step in breaking the prejudice habit: making people aware of implicit bias. While some social scientists have questioned
whether making people aware of implicit bias can actually reduce bias,14 social
psychologists and others who study racial bias generally agree that awareness of
the existence of implicit bias is an important first step towards reducing bias.15

A.	Implicit Bias Trainings and Efforts to Educate Jurors
about Implicit Bias
One way to raise awareness about implicit bias is to simply inform individuals
about its existence. Lectures and workshops on implicit bias have become more
commonplace in various institutional settings, including in workplaces,16 law
schools,17 law enforcement agencies,18 and other enterprises. For example, “[m]ore
than half of Google’s nearly 56,000 employees have attended a 90-minute
seminar on unconscious bias,” and
nearly 2,000 of Google’s employees
[I]n order to break the prejudice habit,
have attended “bias busting” workthere must be (1) awareness, (2) desire
shops that “give Google employees
or motivation to break the prejudice
practical tips on addressing unconhabit, and (3) training in ways that one
scious bias.”19 In response to accusacan overcome bias.
tions of racial bias by hosts renting
—Patricia Devine
their homes through Airbnb, Airbnb
announced in September 2016 that
it would offer implicit bias training to its hosts.20 In the government sector,
on June 27, 2016, the Department of Justice announced that it would require
its 23,000 law enforcement agents and 5,800 lawyers in U.S. Attorney’s offices
across the nation to engage in implicit bias training aimed at getting them to
recognize and address implicit bias in their workplace decisions.21
Attention to implicit bias training is also present in courtroom settings,
where some judges have started informing jurors about the existence of implicit
bias and the need to try to guard against such bias. For example, the Honorable
Mark Bennett,22 a federal district court judge in Iowa, routinely tells his jurors,
Do not decide the case based on “implicit biases.” As we discussed
in jury selection, everyone, including me, has feelings, assumptions,
perceptions, fears, and stereotypes, that is, “implicit biases,” that we
may not be aware of. These hidden thoughts can impact what we
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see and hear, how we remember what we see and hear, and how we
make important decisions. Because you are making very important
decisions in this case, I strongly encourage you to evaluate the evidence carefully and to resist jumping to conclusions based on personal likes or dislikes, generalizations, gut feelings, prejudices, sympathies, stereotypes, or biases. The law demands that you return a
just verdict, based solely on the evidence, your individual evaluation
of that evidence, your reason and common sense, and these instructions. Our system of justice is counting on you to render a fair decision based on the evidence, not on biases.23
Attorneys are also educating jurors about implicit bias.24 For example, in
one criminal case out of Alaska, defense attorneys representing a Black teenager
charged with assaulting a White25 classmate were worried that their all-White
jury would assume their client was guilty because of racial stereotypes linking
Blacks with violence and criminality.26 To combat this potential bias, the attorneys spoke about their own racial biases during voir dire to let potential jurors
know that it is normal to have racial bias.27 They also successfully requested
that the judge give the jurors a race-switching jury instruction based on a model
jury instruction I first proposed in a law review article.28 Essentially, the raceswitching jury instruction told jurors they should think about the case with the
same facts except imagine that the defendant was a White teenage boy and the
victim was his Black classmate before deciding whether to find the defendant
guilty or not guilty.29 The jury found the defendant not guilty. Switching as a
means of raising awareness about bias can work in other contexts besides race.30
Limited research has been done on the effectiveness of implicit bias trainings in general and efforts to educate jurors about implicit bias in particular.
The available research, however, suggests that implicit bias training that simply
informs or educates individuals about the existence of implicit bias is insufficient. To have any lasting impact, such trainings must give individuals strategies
for reducing bias.31 Similarly, making jurors aware of the existence of implicit
bias and the fact that it may affect their own decision making may not be
sufficient to make a difference in outcomes.32 One study, for example, found
that jury instructions informing jurors about the existence of implicit bias and
instructing jurors to try to resist relying on generalizations and stereotypes had
no significant effect on judgments of guilt, belief in the strength of the prosecution’s evidence, or length of sentence.33

B. Making Race (or Other Types of Bias) Salient
Another way to raise awareness about implicit racial bias in the context of a
criminal case is to make the possibility of such bias salient. A wealth of recent
research on race salience demonstrates that calling attention to the possibility
of racial bias in others can encourage jurors to treat Black and White defendants the same way. Samuel Sommers and Phoebe Ellsworth have conducted
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numerous experiments studying the possibility that if racial prejudice is made
salient to mock jurors in a criminal case, those jurors are more likely to treat
similarly situated Black and White defendants the same way.
In one experiment, for example, 196 White individuals were approached
by a White experimenter in waiting areas of a major international airport and
asked if they would read a written trial summary and complete a questionnaire
about legal attitudes while they waited.34 The trial summary described a case
involving a high school basketball player who had an altercation with a fellow teammate in the locker room, resulting in a charge of battery with serious bodily injury.35 Half the mock jurors were given a trial summary with a
White defendant and a Black victim, while half were given the same trial summary with a Black defendant and a White victim. In both the race-salient and
non-race-salient conditions, participants were given a description of the defendant and victim, which included the height, weight, race, gender, and age of
each.36 In some of the trial summaries, race was made salient through the testimony of a defense witness who “testified that the defendant was one of the
only two Whites (or Blacks) on the team, and had been the ‘subject of racial
remarks and unfair criticism throughout the season from many of his Black (or
White) teammates.’”37 In others, race was not made salient.38 In the non-racesalient version of the case, there was no mention of the defendant’s race nor
any mention of racial remarks.39 Instead, the defense witness testified that “the
defendant had only one other friend on the team and had been the ‘subject of
obscene remarks and unfair criticism from many of his teammates.’”40 Other
than this testimony, the written trial summaries were the same.41
Sommers and Ellsworth found that the White mock jurors were significantly more likely to convict the Black defendant in the non-race-salient condition (90 percent) than in the race-salient condition (70 percent).42 When
race was made salient, conviction rates for the White defendant (69 percent)
and the Black defendant (66 percent) were fairly comparable.43 When participants were asked to rate the strength of the prosecution’s case, they rated the
prosecution’s case against the Black defendant as significantly stronger in the
non-race-salient condition than the exact same prosecution case against the
Black defendant in the race-salient condition.44 Participants were also asked to
recommend a sentence for the defendant.45 In the non-race-salient condition,
mock jurors recommended a more severe sentence for the Black defendant
than the White defendant than in the race-salient condition.46 Sommers and
Ellsworth concluded that when race was made salient, the participants did
not demonstrate prejudice “because the racial content of the trial activated a
motivation to appear non-prejudiced.”47 On the other hand, “when race was
not a salient issue, a motivation to avoid prejudice was not expected among
jurors, and White mock jurors did indeed demonstrate racial bias in their
judgments.”48
In another study, Sommers and Ellsworth had 211 individuals who
were waiting to depart from gates at a large international airport read a trial
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summary about a man charged with assault and battery against his girlfriend.49
The man was at a bar with his coworkers celebrating a recent promotion when
his girlfriend stood up and started making fun of his physique and sexual performance.50 The defendant yelled at his girlfriend, forced her into a chair, and
then slapped her.51 The slap knocked the girlfriend to the ground, injuring her
ankle.52 In the race-salient version of the case, the girlfriend testifies that the
defendant yelled, “You know better than to talk that way about a White (or
Black) man in front of his friends.”53 In the non-race-salient version, she testifies that the defendant yelled, “You know better than to talk that way about a
man in front of his friends.”54 The only difference between the race-salient and
non-race-salient versions of the case was the defendant’s mention of his race in
this exchange.55
In this study, Sommers and Ellsworth found that when race was not made
salient, both White and Black mock jurors demonstrated racial bias.56 White
mock jurors gave the Black defendant a significantly higher guilt rating than the
White defendant, while Black jurors gave the White defendant a significantly
higher guilt rating than the Black defendant.57 Both White and Black mock
jurors were also more punitive in their sentence recommendations toward the
other-race defendant when race was not made salient.58 White mock jurors
rated the Black defendant’s personality as significantly more aggressive and violent than the White defendant’s, and Black mock jurors rated the White defendant’s personality as significantly more aggressive and violent than the Black
defendant’s.59 When race was made salient, White mock jurors were more likely
to treat the Black defendant the same as the White defendant.60 Black mock
jurors, on the other hand, were still more lenient toward the Black defendant
than the White defendant.61 Sommers and Ellsworth theorized that Black jurors
may view the criminal justice system as inherently biased, and this belief might
motivate them to demonstrate same-race leniency toward Black defendants to
compensate for that bias.62
Sommers and Ellsworth’s research is widely cited, but it is important to
note that Sommers himself recognizes significant limitations in the work:
It remains the case, however, that too little is known regarding the
psychological processes underlying the influence of a defendant’s
race. This gap in the literature prevents conclusions from being
drawn regarding, for instance, whether prejudicial attitudes account
for the influence of defendant race on White jurors, or whether simple awareness of societal stereotypes regarding race and crime is sufficient to impact judgments.63
One concern that judges and others may have is that making race salient
might lead jurors to overcompensate. In other words, if judges or attorneys
make race salient, then jurors might let guilty Black defendants go free and
convict innocent White defendants. The research on race salience, however,
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simply reduces racial bias and results
in White jurors treating similarly situated White and Black defendants
the same; White mock jurors did
not treat White defendants more
harshly than similarly situated Black
defendants.
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The research on race salience . . .
suggests that making race salient
simply reduces racial bias and results
in White jurors treating similarly
situated White and Black defendants
the same.

C. Awareness Alone Is Not Sufficient to Break
the Prejudice Habit
Raising awareness of the possibility of racial bias is a critical first step, but the
existing research suggests educating people about implicit bias is not sufficient
in and of itself to get them to break the prejudice habit. For example, for years
it was thought that merely educating people about the value of cultural diversity and making them aware of the existence of prejudice would help reduce
prejudice.64 While there is some evidence that voluntary enrollment in a class
that focuses on the value of diversity can lead to bias reduction,65 it appears that
mandatory enrollment in a diversity training program is not effective at reducing bias.66 This might be because some people resent being forced to expend
time and effort on something they might view as political correctness training.
Similarly, it appears that simply telling people that they should try to avoid
relying on stereotypes is not an effective way of permanently reducing bias.67
While telling people to suppress their stereotype-congruent responses may work
in the short term, such interventions may lead to greater reliance on the stereotype when the person stops consciously trying to suppress the stereotype. For
example, in one study, participants were shown a photograph of a skinhead
and asked to write for five minutes on a day in the life of the person in the
photograph.68 Half of the participants were told to try not to rely on stereotypes
about skinheads when writing their narrative.69 The other half were not given a
stereotype-suppression instruction.70 As might be expected, the narratives by the
individuals told not to rely on stereotypes were less stereotypical than the narratives by the individuals in the control group who were given no such instruction.71 Sometime after this initial exercise, participants were shown a color
photograph of another skinhead and asked to write about a day in this skinhead’s life.72 This time, the narratives by the participants who were initially told
to suppress stereotypes were more stereotypic than those by the control group.73
In a second experiment, which replicated the first part of the experiment
described above, each participant was told after writing their narrative that they
would meet the person in the photograph, and then the participant was taken
to an adjacent room with eight empty chairs.74 A jacket and a backpack were
on the first chair.75 The participant was told that the person in the photograph,
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the skinhead, must have gone to the restroom and would be right back.76 The
participant was told to choose any seat.77 Interestingly, participants who had
been given the stereotype-suppression instruction chose seats further away from
the seat with the jacket and backpack, whereas participants in the control group
who did not receive a stereotype-suppression instruction chose seats closer to
the seat where the skinhead presumably had left his belongings.78 The researchers who conducted the study hypothesized that there is a rebound effect when
individuals are told to suppress stereotypic thoughts.79 In other words, when
people attempt to suppress unwanted thoughts, these thoughts will reappear
later with even greater insistence than if they had never been suppressed.80
According to the authors of this study, this rebound effect happens “[a]s a
consequence of the ironic monitoring process that occurs during suppression”
because “unwanted constructs are continually stimulated or primed.”81
Other social science research also suggests that calling attention to race,
either by asking people not to rely on race or asking them to rely on race, counterintuitively increases the tendency to rely on stereotypes. For example, B. Keith
Payne tested whether actively highlighting race prior to the decision to shoot
reduced or increased stereotype-congruent errors in the decision to shoot.82 Participants were told they would see pairs of pictures presented briefly—a face
in the first picture and an object, either a gun or a hand tool, in the second
picture—and they were to decide quickly whether the object in the second
picture was a gun or a tool.83 Individuals in the control group were given no
other instructions.84 Participants in the “Avoid Race” group were given the same
instructions described above but were also told,
You have been randomly assigned to take the perspective of a completely unbiased person. Regardless of your personal views, we
would like you to base your responses only on whether the second
object looks more like a gun or tool. Try not to let the race of the
face influence your decisions.85
Participants in the “Use Race” group were given the same instructions as the
control group, but were also told,
You have been randomly assigned to the “racial profiling” condition.
Regardless of your personal views, we would like you to play the role
of someone engaged in racial profiling. That is, try to make correct
classifications, but we would like you to use the race of the faces to
help you identify the gun or tool in question.86
All participants misidentified tools as guns more often after seeing a Black
face than after seeing a White face.87 They also misidentified guns as tools more
often after seeing a White face than after seeing a Black face.88 Surprisingly, however, making race salient increased the tendency of individuals to stereotypically
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misidentify objects regardless of whether participants were told to avoid relying
on race or to use race.89 Participants in both the “Avoid Race” and the “Use
Race” conditions were more likely to misidentify harmless objects as guns when
held by Blacks and misidentify guns as harmless objects when held by Whites
than participants not given any instruction calling attention to race.90
What conclusions might we draw from these studies? A skeptic might conclude that making race salient helps reduce bias in some cases but exacerbates
bias in other cases, so the best course of action is to do nothing. The research
discussed above, however, suggests that salience reduces bias in complex settings where individuals have to make intricate judgments—like jurors deciding
whether to find a defendant guilty or not guilty—but such salience may have
the opposite effect when individuals have to make a quick decision, such as
whether to shoot a suspect who appears to be armed or where to sit before
a skinhead who has gone to the restroom returns to the room. In the courtroom setting, where the fact finder has time to consider different arguments
and weigh the credibility of witnesses, making race salient is likely to be more
beneficial than harmful. Indeed, research on implicit bias and judicial decision
making by Jeffrey Rachlinski, one of the authors of Chapter 5, which addresses
implicit bias in judicial decision making, lends support to this theory.91 In Rachlinski’s study, White judges who showed a strong preference for Whites were
able to mediate their pro-White preference and treat Black defendants fairly
when they suspected that their decisions were being evaluated for racial bias.92

Conclusion
As discussed above, there are various ways to raise awareness about implicit
bias. In the workplace setting, employers can give employees the opportunity
to attend implicit bias workshops and lectures. In the courtroom, judges can
educate jurors about implicit bias. Attorneys can also make bias salient during
voir dire, in opening and closing statements, and through witness testimony.
Raising awareness about implicit bias is an important first step to reducing implicit bias, but it is only the first step. One must be motivated to break
the prejudice habit and trained in ways to overcome implicit bias. The ensuing
chapters will address various ways to motivate people to break the prejudice
habit and overcome the implicit bias that affects us all.
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